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Abstract
Sanctions for regulation violations are used to deter conduct which could potentially result
in great social harms. This practice over-deters talented entities and under-deters untalented
entities, which leads to social losses. This paper analyzes whether and how such social losses
can be mitigated. I show that this can be achieved by allowing regulatees to purchase passes
exempting them from regulations at appropriate prices.
Keywords: Regulations, optimal deterrence, exemptions.
1. Introduction
Regulations are often used to overcome the judgment proof o¤ender problem by deterring conduct
which could potentially result in great social harms.1 Common examples include safety and corporate
regulations. The objective of most regulations in these elds is to prevent or decrease the probability
of harm by illegalizing certain conduct which are deemed to be dangerous.
I would like to thank an anonymous referee, and the participants of the 2010 EALE conference for useful comments
and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
yGeorge Mason University School of Law, 3301 Farifax Dr, Arlington, VA, USA. E-mail: mmungan@gmu.edu.
1See Shavell (1993 p. 279) observing the same fact. See also, Shavell (1986 p. 45), where the author
describes the judgment proof problem: "Parties who cause harm to others may sometimes turn out to be
judgment proof,that is, unable to pay fully the amount for which they have been found legally liable."
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The dangerousness of conduct, however, may depend on the party committing it. A skilled
worker is less likely to fall from a ladder which does not satisfy safety standards, than a new worker.
Moral hazard may pose less of a threat to family companies than to professionally managed compa-
nies. A building located on top of a hill may be more or less threatened by potential earthquakes.
Hence, expected harms caused by non-compliance with standards regulating dangerous conduct may
depend on the characteristics of the non-complying party. Furthermore, the cost of complying with
regulations may vary across parties. Providing records and detailed accounting reports of company
activities may be more expensive for an investor than for an exporter, or vice versa. Therefore, the
expected social benet of having a regulatee comply with a particular regulation depends on that
particular regulatees characteristics.2
It would be ideal if entities were to comply with regulations if and only if the expected social
benet from their compliance were positive. But, since uniform sanctions apply to all entities
violating regulations, it is impossible to provide incentives to regulatees which produce this ideal
result.3 Uniform sanctions under-deter regulatees, who create non-trivial risks of social harm by
violating regulations, but for whom compliance is very costly. Similarly, uniform sanctions over-deter
regulatees, for whom compliance is not very costly, but who generate quite low risks by violating
regulations.
Over-deterrence, as well as under-deterrence, is socially undesirable. Social costs arising from
these problems can be mitigated by allowing entities to opt-out of regulations at an appropriate price.
Purchasers of such passeswould be shielded from sanctions for violating regulations, but not from
sanctions for causing harm. As such, only those entities who have a small chance of causing harm
by violating regulations would purchase passes. Therefore, some regulatees who would otherwise be
over-deterred can be incentivized to purchase passes and engage in the regulated conduct.
This last point can be demonstrated by a simple example. Consider a regulation which requires
2See Shavell (1984 pp. 365-366) making a similar observation.
3See Shavell (1990) for a statement and proof of this impossibility in the context of punishment of attempts. The
authors analysis is equally applicable for analyzing regulations, and is re-produced in section 2.A.
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rms to comply with certain accounting regulations to eliminate potential fraud. The sanction is
$200K for regulation violations, and $1M for fraud. If a rm violates the regulation, it is detected
with a probability of 0:5. If an employee commits fraud, such fraud is also detected and penalized
with a probability of 0:5. Assume for simplicity that compliance with regulations guarantees that
employees will not commit fraud. Now consider two rms, A and B. If rm A [B] violates the
regulation, its employees may commit fraud with a probability of 0:3 [0:1]. In this example, if
exemption passes were sold at $80K, only rm B, the high talent rm, would potentially buy it. This
simple example demonstrates how passes can be appropriately priced to mitigate over-deterrence by
shielding high-talented rms from sanctions for harmless regulation violations.
Absent exemption passes, it would be undesirable to set sanctions for regulations as high as
possible, because such sanctions would lead to high costs associated with over-deterrence. In other
words, absent passes, sanctions for regulation violations would be chosen to balance costs of over-
deterrence and under-deterrence on the margin. But when exemptions are possible, as argued, costs
of over-deterrence are mitigated. As such, sanctions for regulation violations can be increased to
eliminate some level of under-deterrence. Hence, exemption passes can be used to reduce under-
deterrence as well as over-deterrence.
Administering a regulatory system which allows for such exemptions may, however, be more
costly than one which does not. Accordingly, welfare gains from eliminating over-deterrence and
under-deterrence must be high enough for the administration of purchasable regulation exemptions
to be socially desirable. Such welfare gains are likely to be high in cases where the regulation seeks
to prevent extreme social harms, and therefore requires very costly compliance measures. Corporate
regulations, such as those implemented pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, are likely to fall under
this category.
It should also be noted that harms resulting from regulation violations must be detectable for
exemption passes to be operationalized. This requirement is unlikely to be met in the context of
many environmental regulations. Consider, for example, waste disposal. Law enforcers may be
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able to observe whether an entity has violated regulations. It is, however, di¢ cult or too costly
to ascertain whether such violations were harmful. Therefore, it is not possible to di¤erentiate
between sanctions for harmful and harmless regulation violations. As such, it becomes impossible
to shield high talent regulatees only from harmless regulation violations, making it impossible to
operationalize exemption passes.
In sum, shielding high-talent regulatees from harmless regulation violations by allowing them to
purchase exemption passes can mitigate problems of over and under-deterrence. Accordingly, when
it is possible to di¤erentiate between harmful and harmless regulation violations, such passes are
welfare enhancing if their administration costs do not o¤-set gains from reducing over and under-
deterrence.
In the next section, I formalize these intuitive ideas by using a deterrence model, and identify
the optimal price for exemption passes.4 Section 3 discusses the scope of the analysis and concludes.
An Appendix at the end contains mathematical proofs of propositions in section 2.
2. Model and Analysis
An individual has the option of engaging in regulated conduct which may cause harm (h). If the
individual complies with regulations by incurring compliance costs of c, then his conduct will surely
be harmless.5 c varies among individuals and is distributed over [0;1). If an individual violates the
regulation, the likelihood of his conduct being harmful is q 2 [0; 1], which represents his talent.
An individual who violates the regulation can be caught and sanctioned. The probability of
detection may depend on whether or not the regulation violation results in harm. p1 and p2 respec-
tively denote the probability with which non-harm and harm will be sanctioned.6 I am assuming
4For a review of deterrence models in the context of law enforcement, see Polinsky and Shavell (2000) and Garoupa
(1997).
5This is a harmless and simplifying assumption. In reality, compliance with regulations may only decrease the
probability of harm, and not eliminate it entirely. To incorporate this observation, it is su¢ cient to interpret h as the
maximum reduction in expected harm through compliance with regulations.
6 I am assuming that p1 and p2 are determined exogenously. This assumption can be justied due to the use of
general as opposed to specic law enforcement as dened in Shavell (1991). See also footnote 12 in Mungan (2010)
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that p2  p1, which reects the fact that observation of harm increases the likelihood of detection.
How o¤enders are punished depends on whether or not individuals may purchase passes which
exempt them from regulations. Sub-sections A and B, respectively, describe sanction schemes when
regulation exemptions cannot be purchased, and when they can. It is assumed in both cases that
sanctions may not exceed a maximum ne of w < h, reecting the fact that there are judgment
proof o¤enders.
A. Law Enforcement without Passes
When exemption passes are not available, an o¤ender is punished with a sanction of s1 for
regulation violations which do not result in harm. On the other hand, if the conduct results in
harm, the o¤ender can be punished more severely at s2  s1. This case is referred to as the No-
Exemption Regime. In this regime, and individual has a simple choice between complying with and
violating the regulation. An individual with talent q faces expected sanctions of Sn(q) by violating
the regulation:
Sn(q) = (1  q)p1s1 + qp2s2 (1)
where (1   q)p1 reects the probability that he will not cause harm, be caught and sanctioned
for a harmless regulation violation. Similarly qp2 reects the probability that he will cause harm
and be subject to sanctions for causing harm.
On the other hand, an individual has to incur costs of c to comply with regulations. Hence, an
individual with talent q and compliance costs c violates the regulation if:
c > Sn(q) = (1  q)p1s1 + qp2s2 (2)
Furthermore, an individual with q generates an expected social harm of qh when he violates the
regulation. Hence, the rst best solution would require that individuals violate regulations i¤7 :
c > qh (3)
for a brief list of other articles employing similar assumptions.
7 I am ignoring indi¤erent individuals with c = qh, since their behaviour does not e¤ect welfare.
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An initial an immediate observation is that the rst best solution cannot be attained. Even
if sanctions were chosen as high as possible deterrence would be inadequate for some individuals
due to problems of judgment proofness. To see this, note that the rst best solution requires that
individuals with q = 1 comply with regulations if c < h. However, an individual with q = 1,
even when nes are maximal, will violate regulations if c > Sn(1) = p2w. Hence, individuals with
q = 1 and c such that h > c > p2w will violate regulations, although it is socially desirable that
they comply. This observation illustrates the fact that a degree of under-deterrence is inevitable for
untalented individuals (i.e. q close to 1).
Moreover, when regulation violations are not sanctioned (i.e. s1 = 0), there is no over-deterrence.
This can be observed by noting that
Sn(q) = qp2s2 < qh, for all q (4)
An implication of this observation is that if s1 is held constant at 0, increasing s2 to the maximal
ne would be desirable, because this would minimize under-deterrence and would not cause over-
deterrence. Finally, given that s2 = w, s1 should be chosen to balance costs of under and over-
deterrence on the margin, which would occur at a positive value of s1.
These observations allow the characterization of the Best No-Exemption Solution by the following
proposition.
Proposition 1: When there are no exemption passes, (i) the best punishment scheme punishes
harmful conduct with the maximal sanction (i.e. s2 = w) , (ii) there are social costs associated with
under-deterrence as well as over-deterrence, and (iii) sanctions for harmless regulation violations
(i.e. s1) optimally trade-o¤ over-deterrence for under-deterrence.
Proof: See Shavell (1990 p. 464) proof of proposition 2. The analysis of the No-Exemption
Regime is identical to the analysis of optimal punishments for attempts in Shavell (1990).
The most important result summarized by proposition 1 is that the Best No-Exemption Solution
produces social costs associated with over-deterrence and under-deterrence. The next sub-sections
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describe exemption passes and how they can be priced to mitigate such social costs.
B. Welfare Enhancing Purchasable Exemptions
A potential way to mitigate problems of over and under-deterrence is to allow individuals to
purchase exemption passes at appropriate prices. Formally, when an individual purchases a pass,
he makes an up-front payment of ye and is not sanctioned for harmless regulation violations but
is subject to a sanction of y2 for harm. Hence, when he causes harm and is caught, he loses a
total of yh  ye + y2. An individual, who does not purchase a pass, faces punishments of the
type described in the No-Exemption Regime. However, to distinguish (optimal) sanctions imposed
under the No-Exemption and Purchasable Exemptions regimes, sanctions for individuals who do not
purchase passes under the Purchasable Exemptions Regime will be denoted as z1 and z2.
Using this notation, expected costs attached to an individuals three options under the Pur-
chasable Exemptions Regime are given by:
Se(q) = ye + qp2y2 (5)
Sv(q) = (1  q)p1z1 + qp2z2; and (6)
Sc(c) = c (7)
where Se, Sv and Sc, respectively, represent expected costs associated with purchasing an ex-
emption pass, violating regulations without purchasing an exemption pass, and complying with
regulations.8
By comparing Se and Sv, one thing that is immediately observed is that Sv is likely to be greater
for talented individuals. This is because, when an individual does not purchase an exemption pass,
the probability of being sanctioned for harmless regulation violations (i.e. (1  q)p1) are increasing
in talent. Moreover, the values of Se and Sv are relevant only for high c individuals, because only
they will violate regulations. Therefore, one can choose sanctions and the price of exemption passes
8 I am ignoring the possibility of purchasing an exemption pass and complying with regulations, since if one is to
comply there is no benet to purchasing an exemption pass.
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such that only individuals above a certain talent threshold qo 2 (0; 1) purchase them. Furthermore,
by choosing zi2f1;2g = si2f1;2g, one can guarantee that low talent individuals (i.e. q > qo) have the
same incentives as they do under the Best No-Exemption Solution.
Given these observations, it follows that by appropriately choosing the price of exemption passes,
and therefore qo, one can mitigate over-deterrence, without a¤ecting under-deterrence.9 This natu-
rally leads to an increase in welfare. Proposition 2 summarizes these results.
Proposition 2: The Best No-Exemption Solution can be improved upon by allowing individuals
to purchase exemption passes at an appropriate price.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 2 veries the claim that exemption passes can be used to increase welfare. It relies
on the fact that one can mitigate over-deterrence without a¤ecting under-deterrence. It does not,
however, identify the characteristics of an optimal Purchasable Exemptions Regime. The next sub-
section is devoted to this purpose.
C. Optimal Schemes with Purchasable Exemptions
When exemption passes are not available, it is (generally) undesirable to set sanctions for reg-
ulations as high as possible, because such sanctions would lead to high costs associated with over-
deterrence.10 Stated di¤erently, under the Best No-Exemption Solution, sanctions for regulations
(i.e. s1) would be chosen to balance costs of over-deterrence and under-deterrence on the mar-
gin. When exemptions are possible, however, as demonstrated in the previous sub-section, costs
of over-deterrence can be mitigated through exemption passes. Therefore, sanctions for regulation
violations can be increased to eliminate some level of under-deterrence, and the amount of over-
deterrence caused by such increases can be o¤-set by decreasing the price of exemption passes.
9See the appendix showing that sanctions and the price of passes can be chosen such that qo =
p1s

1
h+p1s

1 p2w
, which
is the described threshold talent level.
10Theoretically, in cases where the maximum punishment for harmful conduct results in extreme inadequate de-
terrence, maximum sanctions for regulations can be desirable. In reality, however, the punishment for regulation
violations are not as high as the punishment for harmful conduct.
8
Hence, under a Purchasable Exemptions Regime, it is optimal to increase the punishment for regu-
lation violations as much as possible. In other words, the optimal sanction for harmless as well as
harmful regulation violations committed by individuals without exemption passes is maximal.
Proposition 3 summarizes this observation, and characterizes the optimal punishment scheme
under the Purchasable Exemptions Regime.
Proposition 3: Under the optimal Purchasable Exemptions Regime:
(i) there is a cut-o¤ talent level qC such that only (talented) individuals with q < qC purchase
passes,
(ii) individuals with q = qC are under-deterred,
(iii) those who do not purchase exemption passes are punished with the maximal ne for harmful
as well as harmless regulation violations, i.e. z1 = z

2 = w,
(iv) those who purchase exemption passes are punished with the maximal ne for harmful regu-
lation violations, i.e. yh = w,
(v) the price of exemption passes is positive but less than the maximal ne 0 < ye < w,
(vi) ye is that price which optimally trades-o¤ under-deterrence with over-deterrence.
There is an interesting implication of Proposition 3. Although one would suspect that allowing
individuals to purchase exemption passes would increase regulation violations by providing a discount
for harmless regulation violations, this need not be the case. It is true that under the optimal
solution, talented individuals are provided with greater incentives to violate regulations. But it is
also true that untalented individuals are deterred more through the use of maximal nes for harmless
regulation violations. Hence, the overall e¤ect on the number of regulation violations depends on
the talent distribution.
3. Discussion and Conclusion
In the previous section, I showed that exemption passes can be used to mitigate over and under-
deterrence. In doing so, I made the implicit assumption that harms resulting from regulation vi-
olations are detectable. Furthermore, I ignored administrative costs. In this section, I discuss the
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implications of unobservable harms and administrative costs, and how these considerations a¤ect
the scope of the model previously presented.
A. Level of Generality: Attempts and Bounded Compliance Costs
Harmless regulation violations and attempts share a lot in common. In both cases, the actor
has engaged in conduct which could have, but has not, resulted in harm. Nevertheless, I have
intentionally excluded criminal attempts from the scope of this paper. This is mainly because I
believe that criminal attempts are distinguishable from regulations violations in a very important
manner. In order to analyze ordinary attempts, one should focus on o¤enders whose benets are
conditional on inicting harm. That is to say, it should be assumed that a person ordinarily shoots at
her victim hoping that the bullet hits him, and not hoping that she misses her target. On the other
hand, a person not complying with accounting regulations ordinarily does so to avoid compliance
costs.
This distinction is crucial in determining optimal-deterrence policies. If potential o¤enders are
assumed to derive benets that are smaller than the harm they will cause by hurting their victims,
then there will be no such thing as over-deterrence in the context of criminal attempts. To formalize
this idea and show the validity of this claim, consider the following simple notation:
b  is the benet of that individual who derives the most benet from crime.
h is the harm associated with the completed crime, with h > b 
q is the likelihood that an o¤ender will succeed in completing his crime.
In this framework, an individual with benet b from crime is over-deterred if the following simple
inequality holds:
Individuals Expected Benet= qb > qh =Expected Social Cost
However, as noted h > b  and by denition b   b. Accordingly, in this framework, over-
deterrence is not possible.
It could be argued that the same result is likely to hold for regulation violations if one is to
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assume c  < h. This argument is awed. As pointed out, when analyzing regulation violations it
should be assumed that individuals care about cost avoidance and not about inicting social harm.
Accordingly, in the context of regulation violations, an individual who complies with regulations is
over-deterred if:
c > qh =Expected Social Cost
which holds if q < ch .
Therefore, individuals who are highly talented will be over-deterred under a regime that sanctions
regulation violations. This should demonstrate that the main rationale provided in the previous
section extends to cases where the benet derivable from the regulation violation is bounded from
above.
B. Level of Generality: Environmental Regulations
In the previous section, I have implicitly assumed that harms inicted through regulation vio-
lations are perfectly observable. In the context of many environmental regulations this assumption
is unlikely to hold. Consider, for instance, waste disposal. One may be able to observe whether
regulation violations have taken place. It is, however, di¢ cult or too costly to observe whether such
violations have caused substantial harm. When harm is not easily observable, it is no longer possible
to di¤erentiate between sanctions for harmful and harmless regulation violations. As such, even if
entities were to possess di¤erent talents in disposing of waste, the model presented in the previous
section becomes inapplicable.
C. Administrative Costs
Administering a Purchasable Exemptions Regime can be expensive. Accordingly, the desirability
of such a regime depends on whether the benets it o¤ers (from the mitigation of over and under-
deterrence) o¤ sets its administrative costs. The variable costs of administering such a regime seem
to be relatively small. It only requires simple purchases of passes, and keeping records of entities
which have purchased such passes. The determination of appropriate prices for passes may require
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substantial and xed research costs. On the other hand, benets from mitigating over and under-
deterrence increase in the size of expected social harms and costs of complying with regulations. As
such, in cases where the regulation seeks to prevent extreme social harms, and therefore requires
very costly compliance measures, a Purchasable Exemptions Regime would be socially desirable.
Other sources of cost savings associated with exemption passes have been formalized in the
context of self-reporting.11 In particular, regulatory agencies would not have to devote resources
to detect harmless regulation violations by entities which have purchased exemption passes. This
would result in substantial savings from enforcement costs. These savings make exemption passes
more desirable.
D. Conclusion
In a very simple framework, I have shown that allowing individuals to purchase passes exempting
them from sanctions for harmless regulation violations can mitigate problems of under and over-
deterrence.
For such passes to be operational, however, it is required that harms caused by regulation viola-
tions be easily observable. Therefore, it is unlikely that exemption passes could be used to eliminate
over and under-deterrence in the context of many environmental regulations, where harm is di¢ cult
to observe.
Moreover, administering a Purchasable Exemptions Regime may be expensive. These costs can
be o¤-set by reductions in enforcement costs resulting from the lack of need to detect exempted
parties for harmless regulation violations, and by benets associated with mitigating under and
over-deterrence.
Due to these reasons, whether it is desirable to allow entities to purchase exemption passes for
11See Kaplow and Shavell (1994) for a general analysis of self-reporting in law enforcement, where the authors
show that self-reporting "o¤ers two advantages over schemes without self-reporting: enforcement resources are saved
because individuals who report their harmful acts need not be detected, and risk is reduced because individuals who
report their behavior bear certain rather than uncertain sanctions." Kaplow and Shavell (1994, p. 583).
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a particular regulation is an empirical question. However, in the context of corporate accounting
and record keeping regulations, where the costs of under and over-deterrence are relatively large,
exemption passes are likely to increase welfare. Whether such passes would be desirable in other
elds, such as safety regulations, is a question which can only be answered after a careful comparison
of the administrative costs and functional benets of such passes.
4. Appendix
Notation:
s1 , s2  0: Sanction, under the No-Exemption Regime, for harmless and harmful regulation
violations respectively.
z1, z2  0: Sanction, under the Purchasable Exemptions Regime, for non-exempted harmless and
harmful regulation violations respectively.
ye  0: Price for purchasing an exemption pass.
y2  0: Additional sanction, under the Purchasable Exemptions Regime, for non-exempted and
harmful regulation violations.
yh  ye + y2.
(:; :): List describing a No-Exemption Regime, where the components of the list describe values
of s1 and s2, and in that order.
(:; :; :; :) List describing a Purchasable Exemptions Regime, where the components of the list
describe values of z1, z2, ye, and y2, and in that order.
p1: Probability of detection of a harmless regulation violation.
p2: Probability of detection of a harmful regulation violation.
h: Harm associated with harmful regulation violation.
q: An individuals likelihood of causing harm upon violating regulations.
H(q)  qh
c: Cost of complying with regulations.
w < h: Maximal ne.
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Proposition 2: The Best No-Exemption Solution can be improved upon by allowing individuals
to purchase exemption passes at an appropriate price.
Proof: (s1;w) describes the Best No-Exemption Solution, where s

1  w. This solution is derived
in Shavell (1990), and individualsincentives under this solution is represented in Figure 1a. Next,
dene regime O, the Over-Deterrence Mitigating Regime:
O  (s1;w; yOe ; yO2 ) (A.1.)
where
yOe =
p1s

1[h  p2w]
[1  p2]p1s1 + [h  p2w]
(A.2.)
and
yO2 = [w   yOe ] (A.3.)
In O, sanctions for non-exempted regulation violations are identical to those in the Best No-Exemption
Solution. Accordingly, the expected cost of not purchasing an exemption and violating the regulation
(i.e. Sv(q) as dened in (6)) equals the expected cost of engaging in the illegalized act under the Best
No-Exemption Solution (i.e. Sn(q) as dened in (1)):
Sv(q) = Sn(q) = (1  q)p1s1 + qp2w (A.4.)
On the other hand, the expected cost of purchasing an exemption pass and violating the regulation is
given by:
Se(q) = qp2[w   yOe ] + yOe (A.5.)
The cost of compliance is c.
Figures 1b-d represent expected social harm (H(q)), Sv(q) and Se(q) as a function of q, and the
talent level qO at which these functions intersect. Through simple algebra one can verify that the
gures accurately represent the intersection point of all three curves and their slopes. More precisely,
one can verify that
(i) qO =
p1s

1
h+ p1s1   p2w
, (A.6.)
14
(ii) Sv(qO) = Se(qO) = H(qO), (A.7.)
and (iii) Se(qO) has a greater slope than Sv(qO). These claims can be veried by following the steps
below:
(i)
Sv(qO) = (1  qO)p1s1 + qOp2w =
h
h+ p1s1   p2w
= qOp2(w   yOe ) + yOe = Se(qO) (A.8.)
which can be veried by plugging in the expressions for qO in (A.6.) and the expression for yOe in
(A.2.) into the expressions for Sv(q) and Se(q).
(ii) (A.8.) reveals that Sv(qO) = Se(qO), hence showing that Sv(qO) = qOh, should su¢ ce to
verify the claim in (A.7.). Using (A.4), we have that
Sv(qO) = (1  qO)p1s1 + qOp2w = qOh i¤ p1s1 = qO(h+ p1s1   p2w) (A.9.)
Plugging in the value for qO as provided in (A.6.) reveals that (A.9.) holds.
(iii) (A.4) and (A.5) imply that the slopes of Sv(qO) and Se(qO) are respectively given by (p2w 
p1s

1) and p2(w yOe ). Hence, the claim holds i¤ p1s1 > p2yOe . But the expression for yOe as provided
in (A.2) reveals that p1s1 > y
O
e . Hence, Se(qO) has a greater slope than Sv(qO).
Hence, the cost curves in Figures 1b-d are accurate representations. Therefore, they can be used
to determine the behavior of individuals with various talent levels and benets. This is achieved
through the next three observations.
Observation 1: Individuals for which minfSe(q); Sv(q)g  c nd it in their best interest to
comply with regulations, since this is the least costly option. These individuals are represented by
the white area in Figure 1c.
Observation 2: For individuals with q < qO, it follows that Se(q) < Sv(q), hence they will
either choose to purchase exemptions or comply with regulations. For individuals with c > Se(q)
the former option is more protable, hence these individuals choose to purchase exemptions. These
individuals are represented by the shaded area in Figure 1b.
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Observation 3: Se(q) > Sv(q) for individuals with q > qO, hence these individuals do not
purchase exemption passes, and those with c > Sv(q) violate regulations.
These three observations are incorporated in Figures 1a-d. It follows from these gures that
incentives provided in the Best No-Exemption Solution and regime O di¤er from each other only
for individuals in the triangular region ABC. These individuals incur compliance costs in the Best
No-Exemption Solution but they do not in regime O. Since, c > qh for these individuals, O improves
upon the Best No-Reporting Solution by decreasing over-deterrence. Q.E.D.
The following Lemmas are useful in proving Proposition 3.
Lemma 1: A Purchasable Exemptions Regime (z01; z
0
2; y
0
e; y
0
2) such that p1z
0
1  y0e and p2z02 
p2y
0
2 + y
0
e is sub-optimal.
Proof: In this case, Se(q)  Sv(q) for all q, hence nobody purchases an exemption pass. There-
fore, the No-Exemption Regime (z01; z
0
2) achieves the same social welfare as (z
0
1; z
0
2; y
0
e; y
0
2). By deni-
tion the Best No-Exemption Solution produces at least as much social welfare as (z01; z
0
2). But regime
O, as dened in Proposition 2, dominates the Best No-Exemption Solution, and is not a regime that
satises the condition of Lemma 1. Accordingly, (z01; z
0
2; y
0
e; y
0
2) is sub-optimal. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2: A Purchasable Exemptions Regime (z01; z
0
2; y
0
e; y
0
2) such that p1z
0
1  y0e and p2z02 
p2y
0
2 + y
0
e is sub-optimal.
Proof: In case both constraints hold with equality Lemma 1 implies that (z01; z
0
2; y
0
e; y
0
2) is sub-
optimal. When at least one constraint holds with inequality, it must be the case that Sv(q) > Se(q) for
almost all q, hence almost every individual with c > Se(q) purchases an exemption pass. Denote by
I the point where Se(q) intersects H(q). Next, observe that y0h = y
0
e+y
0
2 < w must hold. Otherwise,
p2y
0
2+ y
0
e > p2w  p2z02, which is a violation of the condition stated in Lemma 2. But when y0h < w,
one can rotate Se(q) counter-clockwise around point I, by appropriately decreasing y0e to some y
00
e
and increasing y02 to y
00
2 = w   y00e . The new expected cost curve obtained by this rotation is denoted
as Sne (q) in Figure 2.
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[Insert Figure 2]
As reected in Figure 2, (z01; z
0
2; y
00
e ; y
00
2 ) results in lower under and over-deterrence than (z
0
1; z
0
2; y
0
e; y
0
2),
and p2z02 < p2y
00
2 + y
00
e .
12 Hence, (z01; z
0
2; y
0
e; y
0
2) is sub-optimal. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3: An optimal Purchasable Exemptions Regime (z1 ; z

2 ; y

e ; y

2) must be such that p1z

1 >
ye and p2z

2 < p2y

e + y

2 .
Proof: Lemmas 1 and 2 together imply that any optimal Purchasable Exemptions Regime must
satisfy either
p1z

1 < y

e and p2z

2 > p2y

2 + y

e (A.10.)
or
p1z

1 > y

e and p2z

2 < p2y

2 + y

e (A.11.)
Assume (z01; z
0
2; y
0
e; y
0
2) satises (A.10). In this case there are two possibilities. Either (i) Se(q) and
Sv(q) intersect at some point below (or at) the curve H(q) or (ii) they intersect above it.
(i) If Se(q) and Sv(q) intersect below (or at) H(q), another Purchasable Exemptions Regime
described as (z01; z
0
2;w; 0) dominates (z
0
1; z
0
2; y
0
e; y
0
2), since it results in less under-deterrence but the
same level of over-deterrence. Hence, (z01; z
0
2; y
0
e; y
0
2) cannot be optimal if it satises (A.10) and the
intersection of Se(q) and Sv(q) occurs below (or at) H(q). These results are reected in Figure 3,
where Sne (q) denotes the the cost of purchasing exemptions under (z
0
1; z
0
2;w; 0).
[Insert Figure 3]
(ii) If Se(q) and Sv(q) intersect above H(q), then one can design a new Purchasable Exemptions
Regime, by keeping z02, y
0
e, and y
0
2 constant, but decreasing z
0
1 to z
00
1 , such that the new expected cost
curve (denoted in Figure 4 as Snv (q)) intersects Se(q) at H(q). In this case (z
00
1 ; z
0
2; y
0
e; y
0
2) dominates
(z01; z
0
2; y
0
e; y
0
2), since it results in less over-deterrence but the same level of under-deterrence. Hence,
12Figure 2 illustrates a case where both conditions in Lemma 2 hold strictly. It is easy to verify that the analysis
is not a¤ected when either condition holds with equality.
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(z01; z
0
2; y
0
e; y
0
2) cannot be optimal if it satises (A.10) and the intersection of Se(q) and Sv(q) occurs
above H(q). These results are reected in Figure 4.
[Insert Figure 4]
These two observations reveal the fact that a Purchasable Exemptions Regime satisfying (A.10)
cannot be optimal. Therefore, the optimal Purchasable Exemptions Regime must satisfy (A.11).
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3: Under the optimal Purchasable Exemptions Regime:
(i) there is a cut-o¤ talent level qC such that only (talented) individuals with q < qC purchase
passes,
(ii) individuals with q = qC are under-deterred,
(iii) those who do not purchase exemption passes are punished with the maximal ne for harmful
as well as harmless regulation violations, i.e. z1 = z

2 = w,
(iv) those who purchase exemption passes are punished with the maximal ne for harmful regu-
lation violations, i.e. yh = w,
(v) the price of exemption passes is positive but less than the maximal ne 0 < ye < w,
(vi) ye is that price which optimally trades-o¤ under-deterrence with over-deterrence.
Proof:
(i) An individual purchases an exemption pass only if Se(q) < minfSv(q),cg. Lemma 3 implies
that the optimal Purchasable Exemptions Regime satises (A.11). In this case, Se(q) and Sv(q)
intersect at some talent level qC , and Sv(q) > Se(q) for all individuals with q < qC . Hence, only
individuals with q < qC and Se(q) < c purchase exemption passes.
(ii) Lemma 3 implies that the optimal Purchasable Exemptions Regime satises (A.11). In this
case, Sv(q) and Se(q) can intersect below (or at) the curve H(q) or above it.
Consider a regime (z01; z
0
2; y
0
e; y
0
2), where Sv(q) and Se(q) intersect above H(q). A new Pur-
chasable Exemptions Regime can be designed by decreasing y0e to y
00
e such that the new expected cost
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curve, denoted as Sne (q) in Figure 5, intersects Sv(q) at H(q). In this case (z
0
1; z
0
2; y
00
e ; y
0
2) dominates
(z01; z
0
2; y
0
e; y
0
2), because it results in less over-deterrence. Hence, the optimal Purchasable Exemptions
Regime must be such that Sv(q) and Se(q) intersect below (or at) H(q). Furthermore, as the proof
of part (v) and (vi) will reveal, a Purchasable Exemptions Regime where Sv(q) and Se(q) intersect
at H(q) is sub-optimal. Therefore, under the optimal Purchasable Exemptions Regime individuals
with q = qC are under-deterred.
[Insert Figure 5]
(iii) Part (ii) establishes the fact that Sv(q) and Se(q) intersect below (or at) H(q). Any such
Purchasable Exemptions Regime (z01; z
0
2; y
0
e; y
0
2), where z
0
1 < w or z
0
2 < w, is sub-optimal. To see this,
note that increasing z1 and z2 leads to less under-deterrence at no additional cost (i.e. additional
over-deterrence). This can be veried by Figure 6, which shows that an increase in z01 or z
0
2 leads
to a reduction in under-deterrence.
[Insert Figure 6]
(iv) Denote by I the point at which Sv(q) and H(q) intersect. Next, note that whenever y2+ye <
w, the expected cost curve Se(q) can be rotated counter-clockwise around point I by increasing y2
and decreasing ye. Furthermore, it is easy to note the increase in y2 must be more than the decrease
in ye to achieve such rotation. Otherwise, Se(1) = ye + p2y2 would be decreased, which would be
a contradiction with the fact that the rotation is counter-clockwise. Hence, such rotation requires
an increase in yh. Next, note that such rotation is socially desirable, since it leads to less under-
deterrence and over-deterrence. This is illustrated via Figure 7 Therefore, such rotation should be
continued until yh achieves its maximum level, namely w.
[Insert Figure 7]
(v) and (vi) Given properties (i)-(iv), all that remains to be determined is ye , since the optimal
Purchasable Exemptions Regime is of the form (w;w; ye ;w ye). Moreover, properties (i)-(iv) imply
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the following condition: Curves Sv(q) and Se(q) must intersect at some point below (or at) H(q).
This condition places an upper bound on the choice of ye . To see this note that qC , the talent level at
which the intersection of Sv(q) and Se(q) occur, is a function of ye. In particular, in the following
way:
qC(ye) =
[wp1   ye]
[wp1   p2ye] (A.12.)
(A.12) implies that dqCdye < 0, qC(p1w) = 0, and qC(0) = 1. Next, denote by qD, the talent level
at which curves H(q) and Sv(q) = (1   q)p1w + qp2w intersect. It is clear that qD 2 (0; 1). Now,
the intermediate value theorem can be invoked to state that there exists some yCe 2 (0; p1w) such
that qC(yCe ) = qD. Since
dqC
dye
< 0, it must be the case that ye  yCe , otherwise curves Sv(q) and
Se(q) will intersect above the curve H(q), which is a contradiction with the optimality requirement
identied in part (ii). Therefore, the welfare maximization problem can be expressed as13 :
max
ye2(0;yCe ]
W (ye) =
max
ye2(0;yCe ]
"Z qC(ye)
0
Z 1
Se(q;ye)
(c  qh)f(b)dbg(q)dq +
Z 1
qC(ye)
Z 1
Sv(q)
(b  qh)f(b)dbg(q)dq
#
(A.13.)
where
Se(q; ye) = qp2w + [1  qp2]ye; and (A.14.)
Sv(q) = w[(1  q)p1 + qp2] (A.15.)
f and g respectively denote the density functions associated with compliance costs and talent levels,
and Se = Se(q; ye) reects the dependency of Se on the choice of ye.
Di¤erentiating W with respect to ye, yields:
Wye =  
Z qC(ye)
0
(1  qp2)(Se(q; ye)  qh)f(Se(q; ye))g(q)dq (A.16.)
Next, note that
Wye(y
C
e ) < 0 (A.17.)
13W is maximized over (0; yCe ], because ye = 0 would be a violation of the requirement identied by Lemma 3.
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since the integrand is positive for all q < qC(yCe ). And similarly,
Wye(0) > 0 (A.18.)
since the integrand is negative for all q < qC(0).
Hence, ye , must satisfy:
w > ye > 0 (A.19.)
and
Wye(y

e) = 0 (A.20.)
which implies that the optimal price for exemption passes is positive, smaller than the optimal ne,
and optimally trades-o¤ under-deterrence with over-deterrence. Q.E.D.
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Figure 1c: Purchasable Exemption Regime ‘O’ (Over-Deterrence Mitigating)
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Figure 1d: Purchasable Exemption Regime ‘O’ (Over-Deterrence Mitigating)
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Figure 2: Demonstration of Lemma 2’s Proof
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= Reduction in Under-Deterrence
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I
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Figure 3: Demonstration of Lemma 3 part (i)
(Sv (q) and Se (q) Intersect Below H(q)) 
= Reduction in Under-Deterrence
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Shift from 
Se to Sen
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= Reduction in Over-Deterrence
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Figure 4: Demonstration of Lemma 3 part (ii)
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Figure 5: Demonstration of Proposition 3 (ii)
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Figure 6: Demonstration of Proposition 3 (iii)
= Reduction in Under-Deterrence
Se (q) =y’e+p2qy’2
Shift from 
Sv to Svn
Svn (q) =p1(1-q)w+p2qw
cq1
Sv (q) =p1(1-q)w+p2qw
H(q)=qh
Figure 7: Demonstration of Proposition 3 (iv)
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